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Global environmental problems are some of the most pressing issues that humanity is 
facing. There are few examples of success at resolving them; the fight to protect the ozone 
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on chlorofluorocarbons ( CFCs) t riggered a  s ubstantial i ncrease i n r esearch a nd innova-
tion on alternatives to ozone-depleting molecules. I compare CFC substitute molecules 
to molecules that have similar uses but are unrelated to ozone depletion. After the sign-
ing of the agreement, patents on CFC substitutes increased by 400% and scientific articles 
by 500% compared to the control group. These findings suggest that agreements can in-
deed trigger the development of technological solutions, thereby improving the benefit-cost 
equation of environmental protection.
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Global collective action problems are some of the most pressing issues that humanity is facing.
Environmental concerns such as climate change or biodiversity have seen minimal progress, but
one shining example of success is the fight against ozone depletion. At the end of the 1970s,
scientists warned that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) might destroy ozone molecules in the strato-
sphere and reduce the extent to which humans were protected from solar radiation. The issue
rose to the top of the global agenda, and, in 1987, high-income countries negotiated the Mon-
treal Protocol to phase out CFCs from industrial activities. It was agreed that signatories would
decrease the production and consumption of CFCs following a schedule of reduction targets.
The protocol also included trade restrictions with non-parties in ozone-depleting substances
and threats of banning trade in products made using ozone-depleting substances. Technolog-
ical change unrolled rapidly, and within a decade, the production and consumption of CFCs
decreased by more than 80%.1 The success story of the fight against ozone depletion presents
us with a formidable opportunity to study what worked.
This paper offers the first quantitative study of whether the Montreal Protocol induced sci-
ence and innovation on CFC substitutes. I compile a list of 14 molecules that scientists and
industry experts identified as best candidates for CFC substitutes and consider those molecules
as treated by the Montreal Protocol. I then track mentions of CFC substitutes over time in scien-
tific articles published in journals indexed by ScienceDirect and patents granted by the United
States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO). The primary hypothesis is that the Montreal Protocol
provided a clear signal and powerful incentives for firms and scientists to increase work on
CFC substitutes, which led to an increase in patents and scientific articles mentioning these
molecules. The empirical strategy relies on comparing CFC substitutes with a control group
of molecules used in industrial applications similar to CFC substitutes but with no connection
to ozone. To ensure that the molecules are comparable, I use topic modeling algorithms on the
text of patents and articles to construct molecule-level variables that proxy for the molecules’
scientific and industrial context.
As illustrated in Figure 1, only a few patents and articles on CFC substitutes were pub-
lished before 1987, and the trend before 1987 is flat, possibly indicating that the agreement
was little anticipated. The difference-in-differences (DiD) suggests that the protocol led to a
400% increase in the number of patents related to CFC substitutes (relative to the pre-treatment
period) and a 500% increase in the case of scientific articles. The increase becomes statisti-
cally significant, starting in 1989 for patents and 1990 for articles, two to three years after the
agreement’s signature.2 The estimates are robust to a series of alternative specifications, in-
cluding weighting counts by the number of occurrences of the molecule’s name in the text and
weighting by the number of citations that the document received. As an alternative approach,
I also estimate the protocol’s impact using a synthetic control method and find consistent, yet
smaller, increases of about 135% for patents and 180% for articles.
The Montreal Protocol is often hailed as one of the most successful environmental interna-
tional agreements and remains a point of reference in discussing global environmental problems
such as climate change (Barrett 1999; Sunstein 2007). Yet, the dynamics of innovation in the
ozone crisis are still debated. Some, like Richard E. Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator at Mon-
treal, argued the agreement triggered a vast effort in research to find CFC substitutes3. Others
1. My calculations using UNEP data.
2. This delay is similar to prior results in the literature (Popp 2002) and can be attributed to the time required
to turn research efforts into patent applications and published academic papers.
3. “It was evident (...) that the protocol was in fact moving industry in directions that two years earlier had
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Counts of Patents and Articles Mentioning CFC Substitutes
Note: The graph plots the yearly number of patents and articles mentioning the names of any of the 14 CFC
substitutes. The x-axis corresponds to the application date of patents granted between 1976 and 1999 and the
publication date of articles. We note that only a few patents and articles on CFC substitutes were published before
1987 and that the trend up to 1987 is flat. After 1987, we observe a large increase in both patents and articles
mentioning CFC substitutes.
claim that CFC substitutes were already available at the time of negotiations or that the indus-
try endorsed CFC cuts because it had achieved a breakthrough (Heal 2016; Sunstein 2007).
Although the patenting trend documented in Figure 1 lends more support to Benedick’s claim,
a possible hypothesis is that firms undertook research and development before the negotiations
and kept substitutes “hidden” by not filing patents until the agreement was announced.
I argue that if firms kept hidden some of their innovation, we should expect a one-time
increase in patent counts in the immediate aftermaths of Montreal. Indeed, patenting was the
primary mechanism firms had to protect their innovations. On the one hand, trade secrets were
very hard to keep in the development of CFC substitutes (Parson 2003). On the other hand, the
relatively high degree of competition in the industry ensured that several firms were working on
related technologies, and delaying patenting meant a higher risk of competitors patenting first.
Assuming firms did not patent their innovation before 1987, the signature of Montreal would
have acted as a strong positive shock to their incentives to seek intellectual property rights. I
find that patenting activity shows no spike after the signing of the agreement but, instead, a
progressive ramp up. This lends little support to the narrative that the industry had achieved
some breakthrough which they would have kept secret.
The nature of the technological challenge was, in fact, not consistent with the idea of
a breakthrough. Developing CFC substitutes required experimentation around several well-
known molecules and many industrial applications. Furthermore, the candidate molecules had
been known on paper for decades. Chemical engineers knew that the compounds with the
best potential had to present molecular structures similar to CFCs so that their thermodynamic
been considered impossible.” (Benedick 2009, Chap.8 p.104.)
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properties would best mimic those of CFCs, making them easier to substitute in the myriad of
industrial applications that used CFCs (Pool 1988). Although these molecules were known, sci-
entists needed to learn about their thermodynamic properties, toxicity profile, and environmen-
tal acceptability. Firms had to experiment with new processes and formulas to retrofit installed
equipment with CFC substitutes or replace them altogether. Therefore, developing CFC sub-
stitutes was not about “new-to-the-world” compounds but rather about “new-to-the-industry”
compounds that required research efforts to adapt them to many industrial applications.
I also investigate the possibility that mounting consumer pressure played a role in fostering
science and innovation on CFC substitutes.4 Already in 1985, scientists showed that exten-
sive depletion of ozone was taking place over Antarctica. The so-called ozone “hole” was
causally attributed to CFCs in March 1988, likely increasing the saliency of the CFC threat in
the public’s eyes. To further investigate the role of consumer pressure on fostering innovation
on CFC substitutes, I collect data from the EPA website on all industrial applications of CFC
substitutes and classify substitutes as either consumer exposed, not consumer exposed, both or
undetermined. I find that the increase in patenting for molecules that were not used in consumer
appliances is similar to the increase seen in the broader sample of molecules, suggesting that
consumer pressure unlikely drove the large increase in patenting.
At first sight, it may seem counterintuitive that the Montreal Protocol induced innovation,
or more generally, did anything that would not have happened without it. As shown in Barrett
(1994), theoretical models make the dismal prediction that international environmental agree-
ments occur only when cooperation is easy to achieve, that is, when costs to the players are low
and benefits high. This implies that the Montreal Protocol could not have been far from what
countries would have done unilaterally. I interpret this study’s empirical results in light of such
theories. To do so, I use a model of global collective action where innovation is endogenous
and show how initially modest agreements (those close to the non-cooperative equilibrium)
can over time lead to the cooperative outcome because, by inducing innovation, the agreement
reduces future abatement costs.
Hence, the signature of the Montreal Protocol should be seen as a first modest step in a
series of increasingly ambitious agreements. The targets agreed in 1987 required a 50% cut by
1998, while those negotiated in the London and Copenhagen amendments (in 1990 and 1992,
respectively) enforced a complete ban and added a broader range of molecules to the list of
regulated ozone-depleting substances. The targets agreed in 1987 may be interpreted as modest
because they encoded what the industry thought feasible over a reasonable period. This did not
mean the industry already had all the necessary knowledge and technologies. But it meant
that they expected that they could meet the targets with sufficient investments in research and
development. Notably, the agreement ensured a leveled playing field for all firms competing
in the CFC industry. Indeed, contrary to many other agreements, a key aspect of the Montreal
Protocol is that it built in an enforcement mechanism. Montreal included trade restrictions, and
threats of banning trade in any products made using CFCs, making it economically binding.
Agreements close to the non-cooperative equilibrium, like Montreal, should not be inter-
preted as agreements where costs to the players are low. Instead, we should see them as agree-
ments where costs are expected to be low. Between expectation to realization come the actual
efforts of doing research and development, of implementing ideas that exist only on paper and
that still require experimentation and tinkering. Such endeavors improve technologies making
them more affordable and increasing the scope of their uses. By inducing firms to innovate,
Montreal reduced the expected cost of further emission abatement. In turn, this made it easier
4. Yet another possibility could be the existence of research grants or subsidy programs specifically financing
research and development work on CFC substitutes. To my knowledge, no such programs were ever implemented.
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for governments and industries to negotiate binding amendments with more ambitious targets.
This paper shows that the ozone layer’s success story, therefore, is better summarized as a
series of agreements that progressively ramped up ambitions in emission reductions. We may
think of it as a repeated cooperation game where, at each stage, small but binding reductions
force firms to innovate. This reduces expected abatement costs and leads to better cooperation
outcomes in the next stage. Innovation here plays a critical role in enabling ambitions to ratchet
up. By showing that a low-ambition but binding agreement such as the Montreal Protocol did
encourage the development of technological solutions, this paper suggests such agreements are
potent tools that dynamically improve the benefit-cost equation of environmental protection
and may therefore also be useful to deal with current problems such as climate change.
This paper contributes to the literature on technological change and the environment (Jaffe,
Newell, and Stavins 2002; Popp 2019; Popp, Newell, and Jaffe 2010). Recent studies have
drawn attention to the factors inducing innovation in environmental-friendly technologies. In
particular, the literature has emphasized both the role of energy price increases (Aghion, Deche-
zleprêtre, Hemous, et al. 2016; Popp 2002) and domestic environmental policies (Calel and
Dechezleprêtre 2016; Jaffe and Palmer 1997). This paper, instead, documents that agreements
for global environmental public goods can induce innovation. In principle, like domestic poli-
cies, agreements should force firms to allocate inputs to reduce pollution, thereby inducing
them to innovate (Milliman and Prince 1989; Porter and Van Der Linde 1995). Several studies
investigate the effect of such agreements on pollution outcomes (Aichele and Felbermayr 2011;
Finus and Tjøtta 2003; Kellenberg and Levinson 2014), but they seldom look at the impact on
science and innovation.5
This paper also contributes to the literature on the economics of international environmental
agreements (Barrett 1994; Battaglini and Harstad 2016; Harstad, Lancia, and Russo 2019) and
ozone cooperation (Auffhammer, Morzuch, and Stranlund 2005; Barrett 1994, 2003; Murdoch
and Sandler 2009). Most of the literature has focused on treaty structure. In particular, Bar-
rett (1999) suggested Montreal’s trade measures solved the enforcement problem, and Wagner
(2016) further argued they promoted full participation in the protocol, ensuring its almost-
universal ratification. Outside of economics, studies have focused on aspects relating to nego-
tiations and diplomacy (Andersen and Sarma 2012; Benedick 2009) and qualitative accounts
of corporate strategy and innovation (Falkner 2005; Mulder 2005; Parson 2003; Smith 1998;
Taddonio, Sarma, and Andersen 2012).
The paper first provides background information in Section 2. Section 3 then describes the
data, Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, Section 5 presents the main results, and Section
6 and 7 considers mechanisms and alternative hypotheses. Finally, Section 8 discusses how
the results connect to the literature on international environmental agreements, and Section 9
concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Theory and Hypotheses
The theory of induced innovation states that innovations are biased towards high-priced factors
to make their use more efficient or substitute them. Although the theory was initially developed
by Hicks (1932), the concept has reappeared in the past two decades under the phrase “directed
technical change,” encompassing not just price effects but also market size and regulatory ef-
5. One exception is Dekker, Vollebergh, Vries, et al. (2012) who focuses on transboundary air pollution.
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fects (Acemoglu 1998). The theory was later augmented to include environmental policies. In
the simplest model, environmental regulations force firms to allocate inputs (labor or capital) to
pollution reduction or restrict the choice of technologies and inputs in the production process
(Milliman and Prince 1989). As such, environmental regulations are modeled as extra costs.
The theory of induced innovation argues that environmental policies induce firms to innovate
in the hope of offsetting regulation-imposed costs, at least partially.6 The theory can easily
be extended to international environmental agreements. An agreement would oblige firms to
adapt their production processes only once it is translated into domestic law. However, the sig-
nature on its own immediately changes expectations regarding future domestic environmental
policies, at least, if firms perceive the agreement as binding. Arguably, this is what happened
with the Montreal Protocol.
Montreal included trade restrictions with non-parties in products containing those ozone-
depleting substances and a threat of banning trade in products made using ozone-depleting
substances. The trade restrictions effectively acted as a mechanism for free-rider deterrence and
leakage prevention, rendering the agreement binding. Therefore, the main hypothesis is that
Montreal credibly signaled firms that the continued use of CFCs would become increasingly
costly, and induced them to innovate. Richard Benedick, the U.S. head negotiator at Montreal,
argued that “(it) was evident (...) that the protocol was in fact moving industry in directions that
two years earlier had been considered impossible” (Benedick 2009, Chap.8 p.104.). However,
Benedick only refers to articles published in the New York Times and Chemical and Engineering
News to support his claim.
On the other hand, an often heard narrative argues that CFC substitutes were readily avail-
able before the negotiations. Sunstein (2007) claims that “an international agreement was
largely in the interest of American manufacturers, which had already initiated a transition to
safe CFC-alternatives.” This view is also often expressed in media outlets. For example, The
New York Times, on August 20, 2002, stated that “(the) agreement’s success occurred, in large
part, because substitutes for the harmful chemicals were readily available (...).” Importantly,
such claims are consistent with the theory of why and when agreements appear (Barrett 1994).
In the case of Montreal, that theory implies that the agreement was successfully negotiated
because the costs of doing so were low relative to benefits.
This paper relies on quantitative analysis to disentangle these different hypotheses. Section
8 will further discuss how to reconcile the empirical results with the theory of international
environmental agreements.
2.2 Events That Led to Montreal
The story of the ozone crisis began in 1974 when two chemists laid out the theoretical possi-
bility that CFCs broke down ozone molecules in the stratosphere (Molina and Rowland 1974).
The harmful effects of a thinner ozone layer were not well understood, but it was clear that
more UV light would cause more skin cancers, eye cataracts, and, likely, lower productivity in
fishery and agriculture (Miller and Mintzer 1986).
In the late 1970s, the issue began to take prominence in the media and policy circles. A few
countries and firms unilaterally decided to take action. In August 1977, the U.S. Congress wrote
into law a CFC ban on aerosols by 1978,7 and firms such as DuPont removed CFCs from their
6. The Porter Hypothesis goes further arguing the extra costs imposed by environmental policies can sometimes
be even more than fully offset (Ambec, M. A. Cohen, Elgie, et al. 2013; Porter and Van Der Linde 1995).
7. Similarly, in 1978, Canada, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries all banned CFC aerosols. Germany
called for a European Community-wide ban, but without success.
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spray products because they worried about their public image. These pre-Montreal domestic
regulations and corporate decisions targeted a particular industrial application of CFCs for
which cheap physical substitutes existed (e.g., pump-action sprays instead of aerosol sprays). In
essence, these were zero-cost unilateral moves that did not require significant research efforts.
The low numbers of patents and articles between 1970 and 1987 in Figure 1 indicate that neither
aerosol regulations nor consumer pressure seemed to have stimulated science and innovation
on the 14 CFC substitutes I consider in that period.8 In 1980, the EPA proposed to freeze other
uses beyond aerosols, but U.S. industry blocked the initiative.
At the beginning of the 1980s, concerns over ozone depletion waned. Uncertainties in
the science of atmospheric ozone seemed irreducible, and the year 1981 saw the inauguration
of a strongly anti-regulatory American administration. In Europe as well, many governments
persisted in opposing environmental regulations that would harm manufacturers. Parson (2003)
provides a detailed qualitative account of firms’ reactions during this period. Although some
manufacturers initially started research on potential substitutes in the late 1970s, these efforts
quickly came to an end around 1981. Manufacturers stopped such R&D programs because they
estimated that CFC substitutes would cost around two to five times more than CFCs. It made
no sense to continue working on these substitutes with little sign of regulations underway.9
The political context of Montreal’s negotiations was not without its surprises. In his account
of the diplomatic efforts, Benedick (2009) emphasizes the great uncertainty of the negotiations’
outcome until the last minute and argues that some exceptional turns of events unlocked the
situation. In particular, Reagan unexpectedly overruled his administration and approved the
agreement. The U.S. President had skin cancer removed twice in the past, and it has been
suggested that Reagan’s life experiences weighed heavily on his decision. On the European
side, the most prominent opponent to CFC regulations, the United Kingdom, left the European
Community Presidency, leaving Germany, Denmark, and Belgium, firm proponents, as the
head negotiators. Importantly, in this account of the negotiations, the agreement succeeded
independently from the state of R&D activities on CFC substitutes.
2.3 Which Molecules Were “Treated”?
CFCs are a group of molecules with a particular structure: they contain only carbon, chlorine,
and fluorine atoms. This structure drives their particularly attractive thermodynamic proper-
ties: they are unusually stable, nonflammable, nontoxic, and noncorrosive. Initially, CFCs
somewhat embodied the miracle of modern chemistry as they were ideal for manufacturing
many consumer goods. They were first commercially used in 1928 as cooling fluids for re-
frigerators and were specifically designed to substitute other dangerous refrigerants that were
either toxic or inflammable (Parson 2003). Best of all, they were cheap to produce, and so they
became broadly used in many different industries such as foams, refrigeration, air-conditioning,
aerosols, fire protection, and solvents. CFCs are great refrigerants because they vaporize at low
temperatures and are very energy-efficient coolants. As aerosols, they were used in cosmetics,
household products, pharmaceuticals, and cleaners. Their nonreactive property also made them
key products for cleaning microchips and telecommunication equipment.
Strategies for reducing CFCs included physical substitutes (like pump-action sprays instead
of aerosol sprays) or recycling. However, the most critical applications, such as air-conditioning
units, needed chemical substitutes. Importantly, the intricate relationship between molecular
structure and industrial properties implied that the set of possible substitutes was not infinite:
8. These 14 CFC substitutes were targeting foams, refrigeration and solvent applications of CFC.
9. For details, see Parson (2003, Chap.3 p.53 and Chap.7 p.173).
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good candidates required a molecular structure similar to CFCs but with fewer chlorine atoms.
Such compounds are known as hydro-chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydro-fluorocarbons
(HFCs). For example, CFC-12 is a compound that contains two chlorine atoms. When a
hydrogen atom replaces one chlorine, we obtain a potential CFC substitute called HCFC-22.
When hydrogens replace the two chlorines, we obtain another potential CFC substitute called
HFC-32.10
It was public knowledge that the quest for CFC substitutes lay in the realm of HCFCs and
HFCs. These molecules had been known for a long time, at least on paper and in the lab.11
Hence, developing CFC substitutes was not so much about ”new-to-the-world” compounds
but instead about ”new-to-the-industry” compounds. The key technological challenges lay
in making large-scale production cost-efficient, redesigning processes and equipment already
installed, and learning about environmental acceptability and human toxicity.
I compile a list of potential substitutes using historical records. In December 1988, a report
was issued to investigate the atmospheric dynamics of 12 potential CFC substitutes. Impor-
tantly, this report, known as the Alternative Fluorocarbon Environmental Acceptability Study
(AFEAS), did not cover aspects of the molecules related to industrial activities but merely how
the molecules may interact with human health and the environment once released in the atmo-
sphere. In this paper, I include the 12 compounds studied in the AFEAS report as well as two
other possible CFC substitutes mentioned in Benedick (2009) and Parson (2003).12
3 DATA DESCRIPTION
3.1 Patents
I follow prior literature in using patent counts as a proxy for innovation.13 In the chemical
industry, patenting is an essential way of protecting competitive advantage from new prod-
ucts and processes (Sampat 2018). Since chemicals can often be “reverse engineered,” secrecy
offers a limited mode of appropriation and strong incentives exist to use patenting either to pro-
tect inventions from being copied or to prevent competitors from patenting related inventions
(W. M. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000).14
I collect the texts contained in the abstract and summary description of USPTO patent grants
published between 1976 and 200015. The cleaning procedure involves a series of standard steps
such as lowercasing or removing punctuation.16 Patents contain the names, addresses, and
affiliations of inventors and assignees, which I categorize by type (e.g., business, education,
or government). To associate patents to specific countries, I use the country of the assignee.
10. More details are available in Online Appendix Figure A1.
11. The first-ever granted patents related to HCFCs and HFCs typically go back to the 1930s; at the time,
chemists were experimenting with halogenation processes and heat transfers. For example, in 1934, a patent is
claimed for a ”method of producing refrigeration which comprises evaporating in the vicinity of a body to be
cooled and subsequently condensing CH2ClF.” US Patent 1,968,049. CH2ClF is a.k.a. HCFC-22.
12. HFC-245fa and HFC-365mfc are mentioned as possible substitutes in foams. Online Appendix Table A3
shows the name and additional information about all molecules considered in the analysis.
13. Examples and reviews include Hall and Jaffe (2012), Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1998), Popp (2005),
and Williams (2013, 2017).
14. See for example Moser (2012) for an examination of how the publication of the periodic table in 1869
made chemicals easier to reverse engineer and led chemical inventors to shift from secrecy to patents in the mid-
nineteenth century.
15. The full-text patent data is available at bulkdata.uspto.gov/. It represents a total of 2,605,925 patents.
16. Full details are provided in Online Appendix A.
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When patents have no assignee but only inventors, I use the country of the inventor. More
details about how the meta-data is cleaned, matched, and classified by type are provided in
the Online Appendix A. I use the OECD Citations database File to obtain data on the number
of forward citations received by each patent.17 Finally, I sort patents by application date as
opposed to the date when they are granted to use a better measure of when the ideas present in
the patents initially emerged.
3.2 Articles
The development of CFC substitutes required a better understanding of the fundamental ther-
modynamic properties of the proposed molecules and how they would interact with humans
and the environment. Following prior literature, I use counts of scientific articles as a proxy
for increases in such knowledge.18 I collect scientific articles published between 1970 and
2000 in journals indexed by ScienceDirect, which hosts articles from about 2,500 academic
journals published by Elsevier. The sample provides excellent coverage of journals in fields
related to engineering and physical sciences and allows to characterize trends in the emergence
of scientific knowledge related to CFCs substitutes. I used ScienceDirect’s API to download
the full text of articles in journals from the following disciplines: chemistry, chemical engi-
neering, engineering, environmental science, materials science, and physics and astronomy.19
After a series of cleaning procedures described in Online Appendix A, I obtain a total number
of 1,811,301 articles. For data on affiliations and citation counts, I query the Scopus search
API, and use the Global Research Identifier Database20 to classify authors’ affiliations (e.g.,
education or company).
3.3 Searching for Molecule Names
Chemical compounds often go by several names; for example, HCFC-22 has 39 other possible
names, such as chlorodifluoromethane or algeon 22. I develop an automatic script to collect all
possible names on SciFinder, a database of chemical information maintained by the American
Chemical Society, and search through the text of patents and articles for any occurrence of
these names.21 I proceed similarly to identify the patents and articles that mention any of the
171 HAPs.22 The frequency with which molecules are mentioned in any one document can
vary widely. As a robustness check, I construct a measure of counts weighted by the number
of occurrences of molecules in the documents in Section 5.2.
In total, I find 3270 patents and 1926 articles mentioning at least one CFC substitute. Online
Appendix Tables E1, E2. and E3 illustrate the types of patents and articles that mention CFC
substitutes. The most common patent codes are related to chemical compounds containing
17. OECD, Citations database, February 2019
18. Examples and reviews include Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and J. Wang (2010), Pierre Azoulay, Fons-Rosen, and
Zivin (2019), Iaria, Schwarz, and Waldinger (2018), Redner (2005), Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005), and D.
Wang, Song, and Barabási (2013).
19. Journals are listed by disciplines on Elsevier’s website: https://www.elsevier.com/solutions/sciencedirect/
content/journal-title-lists.
20. https://www.grid.ac/
21. I look for any English name listed in SciFinder but I do not look for chemical symbols. The articles’ text
is usually the output of optical character recognition, and chemical symbols and formulae are too often rendered
with mistakes. A full list of all the possible names of CFC substitutes is shown in Online Appendix Table A4.
22. The search procedure may lead to measurement error with over-detection if documents mention molecules
that are core to the subject of the document. Such measurement error should occur similarly for both the treated
and control molecules.
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halogen atoms. The most cited patents correspond to innovations for the pharmaceutical sector,
while the most cited articles focus on physical characteristics or new synthesis routes. More
than 96% of patents are granted to for-profit organizations, while the rest is filed by educational
and public sector organizations. American assignees represent about 60% of patents, European
around 25%, and Japanese around 12%.23
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.1 A Sharp Post-1987 Increase
In this section, I examine the temporal trends in the yearly count of documents about CFC sub-
stitutes. As Figure 1 illustrates, the numbers of patents and articles increase after the signature
of Montreal in 1987.24 I quantitatively investigate these temporal patterns with first-difference
specifications. Equation 1, below, models a mean shift while Equation 2 models a trend-break.
Countmt = α +β0 ×λpost1987 +λm + εmt (1)
Countmt = α +β1 ×Years×λpost1987 +β2 ×Years+λm + εmt (2)
Countmt is the number of documents mentioning molecule m in year t; λpost1987 is a dummy
variable that equals one when t > 1987; λm are molecule fixed effects; Years is a continuous
variable indicating the number of years relative to 1987. The main hypothesis is that β0 and β1
are both positive for CFC substitutes, implying significant increases in research and patenting
activities relating to CFC substitutes after 1987 once Montreal passed.
Table 1 presents the results for these specifications. The sample here consists of the 14
different CFC substitutes for which I track the number of patents and articles throughout the
years. I run separate regressions for patents and articles, and bootstrap standard errors. Model
1 confirms that a significant and positive mean shift after 1987 in the number of patents and
articles mentioning CFC substitutes. The coefficients indicate almost 30 additional patents
and around 13 additional articles for the average CFC substitute every year after 1987. This
corresponds to a 551% increase (594% increase) in the number of patents (articles) for the
years 1987-2000 relative to the years 1975-1986. Model 2 shows that the change can also be
modeled as a trend break. The coefficient for “Years” indicates that there is a small positive
underlying trend for articles.
The post-1987 increase, however, may be driven by factors other than Montreal (e.g., poli-
cies or macroeconomic conditions fostering academic and industrial research in the 1990s). To
further investigate whether the post-1987 increase can be causally attributed to the protocol, I
use a set of molecules known as HAPs as a comparison group.
4.2 Hazardous Air Pollutants as a Comparison Group
HAPs is an umbrella term for molecules categorized as hazardous air pollutants that became
monitored under the 1990 Clean Air Act due to adverse ecological impacts and human health
23. Online Appendix Table E4 displays summary statistics about countries and affiliations of patent assignees
and authors of articles.
24. Online Appendix Figure C1 plots time-series similar to Figure 1, but each CFC substitutes separately. The




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Patents Patents Articles Articles
Post 1987 29.510∗∗∗ 6.097∗∗ 13.022∗∗∗ 2.113
(2.113) (2.632) (1.072) (1.581)




Molecule FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bootstraped Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.639 0.736 0.577 0.630
Observations 322 322 406 406
Standard errors in parentheses
Years are relative to 1987.
Time-series: (1976-1998) for patents; (1970-1998) for articles
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table presents regression results for first-difference specifications. Model 1 and 3 confirm that there is
a significant and positive mean shift after 1987 in the number of patents and articles mentioning CFC substitutes.
Model 2 and 4 indicate that the change can also be modeled as a trend break. The coefficient for ‘Years’ indicates
that there is a small but statistically significant positive underlying trend for articles.
concerns including cancer, asthma, congenital disabilities, reproductive effects, and neurode-
velopmental effects. Examples include benzene, chromium, or formaldehyde.25 HAPs are
an appropriate comparison group for CFC substitutes because their industrial applications are
very similar. Figure 2 shows that patents about CFC substitutes and HAPs are associated with
similar technology codes. Importantly, HAPs are also unrelated to ozone depletion and are
therefore not affected by the Montreal Protocol.26 Going further, one would like to ensure that
the HAPs chosen are as similar as possible to CFC substitutes in terms of chemical, physical,
and industrial properties. To do so, I leverage topic modeling algorithms, as explained in the
next subsection.
One concern is that research efforts on CFC substitutes and HAPs are substitutes to each
other and that research on CFC substitutes crowds out research on HAPs. This would violate
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires that the response of the
treated unit depends only on the treatment assigned to that unit and that there are no spillovers
between units in different treatment groups. Comparing patents assignees of CFC substitutes
and HAPs, I find that 75% of CFC substitutes assignees never patented on HAPs.27 Few firms
are active in both CFC substitutes and HAPs, which supports the SUTVA.28
Another concern is that policies may have impacted research and innovation related to
HAPs during the same period of analysis. In particular, in 1990, an amendment to the Clean
25. The full list of HAPs is displayed in Online Appendix Table A2.
26. Three HAPs (chlorine, methylenechloride, trichloroethylene) were suggested as possible CFC substitutes. I
therefore exclude them from the sample. I use the EPA SNAPs website to obtain the list of compounds or devices
suggested by firms to the EPA as possible alternatives to CFCs.
27. For this exercise, I focused on the top HAPs entering the synthetic control.
28. Examples of assignees that file patents related to both CFC substitutes and HAPs include 3M, Allied Chem-
ical, BASF, Dow Chemical, and Procter & Gamble. These are all very large and broad companies from the
chemical industry which likely would host CFCs and HAPs activities in different business units.
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F25: Refrigeration or Cooling
B01: Chemical Processes, Apparatus
C10: Petroleum, Gas or Coke Industries
C11: Oils, Fats
C23: Coating Metallic Material
Other
FIGURE 2
Patent IPC Codes: CFC substitutes vs. HAPs
Note: The figure shows that patents mentioning CFC substitutes and HAPs fall into similar patent codes. HAPs are
a group of 171 molecules that have no relationship to ozone and that are used for diverse industrial applications.
The figure confirms that the two groups of molecules present remarkable similarities, which motivates the use of
HAPs as control molecules to estimate the causal effect of the post-Montreal regime. The patent codes are from
the international patent classification (IPC).
Air Act required the EPA to promulgate regulations establishing emission standards for large
sources of HAPs. However, the EPA published the initial promulgation schedule in 1993 only,
and so, in practice, HAPs are not impacted by this policy change until later in the period that I
consider.29 I nonetheless take a conservative approach and limit my analysis to the time-period
until 1992 for patents and 1995 for articles. The additional three-year period for articles is to
account for further delays between submission and publication of scientific articles.30
4.3 Topic Modeling
I use a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) algorithm to model which topics are present in the
documents (Blei 2012; Blei and Lafferty 2009). In this context, a topic means a distribution
over words, and a document a distribution over topics. The number of topics is a parameter
chosen by the experimenter. I run several LDA models, each with a different number of topics,
and compute their coherence score (Röder, Both, and Hinneburg 2015).31 For each corpus,
I choose the lowest number of topics that offers the highest coherence score, which is 20 for
patents and 15 for articles.32
I use the trained topic models to generate document-level variables called topic proportions.
29. The EPA published the initial list of ”source categories” in 1992 (i.e. the list of industries and production
processes targeted by the regulations), and in 1993, the promulgation schedule specified by which year sectors
were expected to comply with the emission standards for each category or subcategory of major sources and area
sources of HAPs. This was known as the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant (NESHAP),
and most sectors were asked to comply by 1997 or 2000.
30. This problem does not arise for patents since the data provides the application date of patents.
31. Online Appendix Figure B2 shows that coherence increases with the number of topics up to a certain point.
32. I train the algorithm, not on the entire corpus, but on the subset of documents that contain at least one
mention of a molecule
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These variables take values between 0 and 1 and indicate to what extent a topic is present in
a document. Said differently, the model uses the words appearing in a document to infer the
proportion of each topic in that document. I aggregate topic proportions at the molecule level
by calculating weighted means where the weights are proportional to the number of times a
document mentions a molecule.33
The molecule-level topic proportions describe quantitatively what the documents with molecule
i talk about. They help describe and measure the molecule’s chemical and industrial charac-
teristics. Figure 3 displays a series of scatterplots illustrating the variation in topic proportions
across molecules. Some HAPs have values of topic proportions that stand out as outliers, indi-
cating that they present semantic contexts that are very different from those of CFC substitutes.
This, in essence, illustrates why topic proportions are useful: they allow us to control for dif-
ferences across molecules.
Online Appendix Tables B1 and B2 provide the full list of words the topics contain. The
documents are highly technical, and topics can be challenging to interpret. For example, for
patents, the most likely word in Topic 1 is “polymer” (with probability 0.61). Then come
“catalyst” and “carbon.” A trained chemist may suggest labeling Topic 1 “Catalysts on polymer
substrates.”34
33. Online Appendix Figure B1 summarizes these steps.
34. Catalysts are molecules (typically “metals”, word 7 in topic 1) used to start and maintain chemical reactions.
They are often made more effective by being “attached” to a polymer substrate. Hence, the production of such
catalysts often involves a “polymerization” process (word 6 in topic 1) where free “radicals” (word 13 in topic 1)
ensure the addition of new monomers to the polymer chain.
14































































































Topics Proportions and Counts for Selected Topics.
Note: Topic modeling allows to measure the proportions of different topics in documents. Topic proportions are
then averaged over all documents mentioning a given molecule (across all years in the sample). The x-axis on
the figure above plots the average topic proportion for a given molecule. The y-axis shows the average number of
documents mentioning a given molecule. The graphs highlight that CFC substitutes and HAPs don’t always have
comparable topic proportions indicating that their semantic contexts can very different. Using topic proportions
in the DiD and synthetic control methods therefore provides a way of controlling for variation in how different
molecules are mentioned in the text of documents.
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Pre-Trends in Counts of Documents Mentioning CFC Substitutes and HAPs
Note: The graphs display the pre-trends for the treated group (CFC substitutes) and the control group constructed
using a subset of the HAP molecules that have counts and pre-trends closest to the average CFC substitutes.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Difference-in-Differences
HAPs are related to industrial activities similar to those of CFC substitutes, but some are more
similar to CFC substitutes than others. In particular, some have much higher counts than the
average CFC substitute.35 In what follows, I exclude from the control group HAPs that have
average pre-period counts larger than ten times that of the average CFC substitute. I then
rank the remaining HAPs according to how close their pre-trend is to that of the average CFC
substitute. The control group is constructed such that it contains the 28 HAPs with the closest
slope. I choose the number of HAPs to be 28 so that the control group has twice as many
units as the treated group. Figure 4 shows that pre-trends for the treated and control groups are
parallel.
I estimate the following two DiD models: a mean shift specification (Equation 3) and a
trend-break specification (Equation 4):
Countmt = α +β0 ·Dm ·Postt +λt +λm + γt ·Xmt + εmt (3)
Countmt =α+β1 ·Years ·Postt ·Dm+β2 ·Years ·Postt +β3 ·Years+λt +λm+γt ·Xmt +εmt (4)
Countmt stands for the number of documents mentioning molecule m in year t; Postt equals
one when t > 1987; Dm equals one if the molecule belongs to the treated group; Years is a
continuous variable indicating the number of years relative to 1987; λm are molecule fixed
effects; λt are year fixed effects; Xmt is a vector of topic proportions. β0 identifies the DiD
estimate. The primary hypothesis is that β0 and β1 are positive. Furthermore, Online Appendix
Table C1 displays balance tables for topic proportions and highlights that, for most topics,
proportions are significantly different across the two groups. They may, therefore, capture
relevant variation.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patents Patents Patents Patents Articles Articles Articles Articles
Post 1987 x Substitutes 16.543∗∗∗ 21.124∗∗∗ 0.455 3.443 7.581∗∗∗ 12.634∗∗∗ -0.273 1.437
(1.740) (2.056) (2.681) (2.494) (1.118) (1.689) (1.625) (2.485)
Post 1987 x Substitutes x Years 5.235∗∗∗ 5.773∗∗∗ 1.825∗∗∗ 2.057∗∗∗
(1.005) (0.825) (0.379) (0.500)
Substitutes x Years 0.045 -0.004 -0.027 0.109
(0.117) (0.133) (0.078) (0.159)
Years -0.073 -0.086 0.183∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.066) (0.029) (0.042)
Post 1987 1.182∗ 1.205 0.968∗∗ 0.913∗
(0.647) (0.760) (0.449) (0.515)
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Molecule FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Topics (weighted) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Bootstraped Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.841 0.859 0.854 0.875 0.634 0.640 0.634 0.638
Observations 714 595 714 595 1092 846 1092 846
Standard errors in parentheses
Years are relative to 1987.
Time-series: (1976-1992) for patents; (1970-1995) for articles
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table presents regression results for difference-in-difference specifications. Model 1 and 5 confirm
that there is a significant and positive increase after 1987 in the number of patents and articles mentioning CFC
substitutes compared to the control group.
The dependent variable is best suited to be modeled as count data using a Zero-Inflated
Negative Binomial model.36 Since results do not differ much from the simpler specification
with counts in levels, I report the latter as the main specification for ease of interpretation and
provide results with a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model as robustness checks in Online
Appendix Table C3.
Table 2 displays the main results. Model 1 and 5 correspond to the differences-in-differences
specification without any controls. The binary variable “Post 1987 x Substitutes” equals 1 for
observations belonging to CFC substitutes after 1987. Model 2 and 6 control for topic propor-
tions and is the preferred specification. The coefficient is large and statistically significant for
patents: it corresponds to an additional 21 patents on average per year per substitute from 1988
to 1992. Since there are 14 CFC substitutes in the sample, this implies 294 additional patents a
year for CFC substitutes in aggregate. It is equivalent to almost a 400% increase relative to the
pre-period mean number of patents (which equals 5.4).
The coefficient for articles is also large and significant: it corresponds to an additional 13
articles on average per year per substitute from 1988 to 1995. Since there are 14 CFC substitutes
in the sample, this implies 182 additional patents a year for CFC substitutes in aggregate. It is
equivalent to a 576% increase relative to the pre-period mean number of patents (which equals
2.19). Model 3, 4, 7, and 8 present trend-break specifications and confirm that the data can
be modeled as a trend break too. The number of patents mentioning CFC substitutes increases
with the years after 1987 by 5.8 patents more than the control group. Similarly, the number of
articles mentioning CFC substitutes increases with the years after 1987 by two articles more
36. A Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model is more appropriate than Poisson here because the data is zero-

























































Difference-in-Differences Treatment Effects by Year Controlling for Topic Proportions
Note: For patents, the treatment effect is statistically significant, starting in 1989 and keeps increasing with time.
For articles, the treatment effect is significantly different from zero from 1990 onwards.
than the control group.
Figure 5 displays the year-by-year coefficients corresponding to Model 2. We note that,
for patents, the treatment effect is statistically significant, starting in 1989 and keeps increasing
with time. We should expect a delay between the moment firms and inventors decide to redi-
rect their efforts towards CFC substitutes and the moment when they are ready to apply for a
patent. However, the time required to obtain any technology worth patenting can vary broadly
from technology to technology, even within the same technological field. We can expect some
patents to be “low-hanging fruits,” i.e., inventions requiring just a few months of R&D work
before applying for a patent. Hence, it is not surprising to observe a significant treatment effect
as early as two years after Montreal. Others have documented similarly fast treatment effects.
In the context of energy patenting, Popp (2002) estimates that the mean lag between a change
in energy prices and patenting on energy-saving technologies occurs in 3.71 years.
For articles, the treatment effect is significantly different from zero from 1990 onwards (see
Panel b in Figure 5). Since the data only contains the publication date of articles (as opposed
to submission date), the lag between treatment and its effect also accounts for processing and
reviewing time at academic journals which, in chemistry and engineering, takes around nine
months on average (Björk and Solomon 2013).
Using HAPs to construct a counterfactual, the treatment effect captures the overall impact
of the protocol’s signature, the country-by-country ratifications,37 and the amendments to the
protocol that happened in 1990 and 1992 (in London and Copenhagen, respectively). It also
includes, therefore, the implementation of these international treaties into domestic regulations.
In the US, this was done through the Clean Air Act amendment of 1990. The counterfactual
represents a world without any of those interventions, that is, a world with limited unilateral
actions. The inherent challenges of any global public good problem provide a good case for
arguing this is an appropriate counterfactual. The absence of costly unilateral actions before
1987 is further testimony to those challenges.38
37. The USA ratified in April 1988; European countries in December 1988.
38. The aerosol bans in the 70s and 80s were not costly because physical and chemical substitutes existed; for





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Count Count Cit Occ Cit-Occ
Post 1987 x Substitutes 21.124∗∗∗ 12.999∗∗∗ 29.849∗∗∗ 33.454∗∗∗ 44.910∗∗∗
(2.056) (1.706) (3.376) (3.786) (6.697)
Count (lag 1) 0.385∗∗∗
(0.074)
Count (lag 2) 0.265∗∗∗
(0.072)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Topics (weighted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bootstraped Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.859 0.897 0.784 0.702 0.664
Observations 595 528 595 595 595
Time span: 1976 to 1992
(b) Articles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Count Count Cit Occ Cit-Occ
Post 1987 x Substitutes 12.634∗∗∗ 5.098∗∗∗ 12.216∗∗∗ 17.619∗∗∗ 18.110∗∗∗
(1.689) (1.250) (3.383) (2.708) (4.430)
Count (lag 1) 0.341∗∗∗
(0.054)
Count (lag 2) 0.340∗∗∗
(0.076)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Topics (weighted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bootstraped Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.640 0.751 0.342 0.490 0.373
Observations 846 790 846 846 846
Time span: 1970 to 1995
Note: The tables present regression results for robustness checks using different outcome variables. Column 1 and
2 use counts as in Table 2; column 3 uses citation-weighted counts; column 4 uses occurrences-weighted counts,
and column 5 uses counts weighted by both citation and occurrences.
5.2 Robustness Checks
I run additional DiD specifications controlling for lags of counts. A typical model of science
and innovation is one with positive knowledge externalities: patents or articles lead to more
patents and articles as scientists and inventors build on previous work. Controlling for lagged
count allows capturing such a cumulative mechanism. Model 2 in Table 3 confirms that the
treatment variable remains statistically significant in both patents and articles. Model 3 shows
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that results are robust to considering, as an alternative outcome variable, counts weighted by
the number of forward citations each document receives. Citations can be interpreted as the
publication’s degree of influence (or “quality”). Panel a and c in Online Appendix Figure C5
show that pre-trends in citation weighted counts look similar across CFC substitutes and HAPs
for both patents and articles.
Similarly, Model 4 shows that the results are robust to considering patent and article counts
weighted by the number of times the molecule appeared in each document (molecule “occur-
rence”). Panel b and d in Online Appendix Figure C5 show that pre-trends in occurrence-
weighted counts look similar across CFC substitutes and HAPs in patents. For articles, a small
pre-trend indicates that when articles contain the name of CFC substitutes, they tend to mention
these substitutes more often over the years. I provide more details about trends in counts for
different thresholds of occurrences in Online Appendix Figure C6.
5.3 Synthetic Control Method
The DiD strategy implemented above assumes that the counts of patents and articles for each
molecule are independent. However, molecules are often mentioned together in the same doc-
uments: in fact, 40% of patents mention more than one molecule.39 Instead of considering
molecules as separate units of observations, an alternative strategy is to bunch them together
and count the number of documents mentioning any of the 14 CFC substitutes. This strategy is
equivalent to considering the 14 molecules as one treated unit, which I refer to as the “aggregate
CFC substitute”. To illustrate, Figure 6 plots both the number of patents mentioning each CFC
substitute, as well as the number of patents mentioning any of the 14 CFC substitutes, i.e., the
“aggregate CFC substitute”.
I obtain an estimate of the treatment effect on the “aggregate CFC substitute” by im-
plementing a synthetic control method (SCM). This allows me to construct a counterfactual
molecule that mimics the evolution of CFC substitutes in aggregate. The synthetic control
method emerged as a way to evaluate the effects of interventions that affect aggregate quanti-
ties (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010, 2015; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Athey and
Imbens 2017). Many interventions are implemented at an aggregate level and impact a small
number of large entities, such as cities, school districts, or states. I enlarge the application of
SCM to a new kind of aggregate entity: field of scientific and engineering inquiry.
The synthetic control method consists of using a weighted average of a set of control units
with the weights chosen so that the weighted average is similar to the treated unit in the pre-
treatment years along some selected covariates and the outcome variable.40 The outcome vari-
able here is the number of patents (or articles) that mention any of the 14 molecules. The
synthetic control is constructed by fitting the values of pre-treatment counts and topic propor-
tions. The treatment year is the first year in which the treatment becomes active: this is defined
as 1988 since Montreal was agreed in 1987. To be conservative, I use data only up to 1985 to
fit the synthetic control. Topic proportions are averaged over the entire pre-1985 period, while
the outcome, count, is not.41
As explained by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015), reducing the size of the donor
pool can limit the risk of over-fitting and interpolation biases. Following their advice, I use
39. Out of 3270 patents mentioning CFC substitutes, 1234 mention more than one CFC substitutes. The DiD
considers 5999 observations when, in reality, there are only 3270. For articles, out of 998, 226 mention more than
one CFC substitutes. Hence the DiD considers 1266 observations when, in reality, there are only 998.
40. Online Appendix C provides more details on the theoretical foundations for the synthetic control method.
41. Online Appendix Table D3 displays the value of each variable’s contribution to the synthetic control.
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Patent Counts for Each CFC Substitute and for the “Aggregate” CFC Substitute
Note: The graph illustrates the difference between considering the 14 separately or together combined as one
treated molecule. Since the names of different CFC substitutes often appear simultaneously in the same docu-
ments, the time series of CFC substitutes are not independent of each other. The thick line labeled “Any CFC
substitutes” corresponds to the number of patents mentioning any of the 14 CFC substitutes. It is equivalent to
considering the 14 compounds as one and only one molecule. I implement the synthetic control method on this
“aggregated CFC substitute.” Online Appendix Figure D1 displays a similar graph for articles.
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a smaller donor pool containing only the thirty HAPs closest to the treated unit in terms of
counts.42 For inference, I follow the non-parametric approach method suggested by Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015). The ap-
proach is akin to implementing placebo tests wherein each unit in the control group is assumed
to have received the treatment in the year 1987. The “true” treatment effect can then be com-
pared to the distribution of placebo treatment effects. A p-value is calculated as the fraction
of placebo effects that are greater than or equal to the effect estimated for the “true” treated
unit. As suggested by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), I compute the ratios of post-
RMSPE over pre-RMSPE and examine where the treated unit lies in the distribution of those
ratios.43
Figure 7 graphically displays the results of the synthetic control method for CFC substitutes.
The graphs on the left-hand side represent the raw effect, which is the observed time series of
the treated group along with the time series of the constructed synthetic control. Graphs on
the right-hand side show the placebo tests to evaluate the significance of the results; the black
lines represent the effect on the treated group relative to the control group, while each gray
line is a placebo test performed on a unit drawn from the donor pool. The treatment effect
on CFC substitutes appears significant for both patents and articles. We note that the black
line rises above most other lines, after 1989. This indicates that, as in the DiD, the treatment
effect is statistically significant, starting in 1989. For articles, the treatment effect is statistically
significant, starting in 1992.
Graphically, the treatment effect corresponds to the area between the two curves on the left-
hand side graphs. Numerically, it corresponds to 84 (resp. 49) additional patents (resp. articles)
per year on average between 1988 and 1992 (resp. 1995). This roughly corresponds to 135%
and 177% increases in patents and articles. To examine more closely the constructed control
unit, I collect information about the top HAPs that enter its composition (see Online Appendix
Table D2). We note that the synthetic control picked up HAPs that have broad industrial ap-
plications (not unlike CFC substitutes). In particular, we find industrial applications similar to
CFC substitutes (e.g., coatings or solvents).
6 MECHANISMS
This section provides more descriptive details about the increase in research and innovation fos-
tered by Montreal. First, examining countries of assignees, I find that the increase in the number
of patents mentioning CFCs applies to all countries and a substantial increase for patents with
assignees located in Japan and the UK.44. We note that US-based private sector firms are the
entities patenting the vast majority of CFC substitutes, both before and after Montreal. The
most frequent IPC codes associated with patents mentioning CFC substitutes before 1987 are
also some of the most frequent after 1987. At the same time, many codes with low or no fre-
quency before 1987 become important after 1987. For example, that is the case of code C10M
which corresponds to “Lubricating compositions; Use of chemical substances either alone or
42. I also check that there is no risk of extrapolation. See Online Appendix Table D1
43. The pre-RMSPE measures lack of fit between the path of the outcome variable for any particular unit and







1/2 where T0 is the
number of pre-treatment periods. A post-RMSPE can be similarly defined for periods going from T0 + 1 to the
end of time-series available.
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(b) Articles: Raw Effect (left) and Placebo Tests (right)
FIGURE 7
Synthetic Control Method Graphs for CFC Substitutes
Note: The treatment effect on CFC substitutes appears significant for both patents and articles. We note that the
black line rises above most other lines, mostly as of 1989. This indicates that similarly, as in the DiD, the treatment
effect is statistically significant, starting in 1989. For articles, the treatment effect is statistically significant,
starting in 1992.
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(a) Number of Assignees






















(b) Number of “New” Assignees
FIGURE 8
Number of Patent Assignees Over Time
Note: Figure 8a displays the number of assignees that patent on CFC substitutes or HAPs in any given year. Figure
8b displays the number of assignees that are “new” (i.e., they apply for a patent on CFC substitutes or HAPs for
the first time). The figure shows that, after 1987, many firms with no prior experience on CFC substitutes begin
patenting. The data for HAPs is normalized such that y-axis values are equal to those of CFC substitutes in 1976.
To limit noise, the sample used to generate the table contains only documents with at least three occurrences of
CFC substitutes.
as lubricating ingredients in a lubricating composition.”45
The post-Montreal burst of innovations on CFC substitutes is also not driven by a few firms
that would have been historically patenting on CFC substitutes since the 1970s. Figure 8a
displays the yearly number of unique assignees with patents mentioning CFC substitutes and
HAPs. It indicates that the post-Montreal patenting world features many more firms. Figure 8
displays the yearly number of assignees that are “new,” meaning they appear for the first time
in the data with a patent mentioning CFC substitutes and HAPs. The figure confirms that, after
1987, many firms with no prior experience on CFC substitutes begin patenting.
7 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
7.1 Were CFC Substitutes Kept “Secret”?
In this section, I examine whether firms may have initiated the transition to CFC substitutes
before the signature of the Montreal Protocol, without patenting but instead keeping their tech-
nologies as trade secrets. At the end of the 1970s, a few firms announced R&D investments
into CFC substitutes. Although the same firms, soon after, announced the termination of those
same R&D programs, it has been suggested that they developed key technologies which they
kept secret. Here, I argue that, if that had been the case, we should expect a one-time increase
in patent counts in the immediate aftermaths of Montreal.
As explained by Parson (2003), trade secrets are difficult to keep when developing CFC
substitutes development. The key remaining barriers were to prove suitability for specific ap-
45. Other examples include “Macromolecular compounds obtained otherwise than by reactions only involving
carbon-to-carbon unsaturated bonds” (C08G), “Cleaning or de-greasing of metallic material by chemical methods
other than electrolysis” (C23G), and “Detergent compositions; Use of single substances as detergents; Soap or
soap-making; Resin soaps; Recovery of glycerol” (C11D).
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(b) Old vs. New Entrants
FIGURE 9
Monthly Counts for Patents Mentioning CFC Substitutes
Note: The graphs show the monthly trends in count of patents mentioning CFC substitutes. Panel 9b shows the
monthly count of patents mentioning CFC substitutes for firms that patented on CFC substitutes before 1987 vs.
those who did not. The period “Before 1987” includes the year 1987. To limit noise, the sample used to generate
the table contains only documents with at least three occurrences of CFC substitutes.
plications. This could not be done in secret as it required partnerships with customers (e.g.,
electronic manufacturers that used CFCs as a cleaning agent). Developing new synthesis pro-
cesses could, in theory, be done in secret. However, several firms were working on the same
molecules. When competitors work on closely related projects, delaying patenting increases
the risk that a competitor patents first. Incentives to be first to patent were therefore particu-
larly strong. If, until Montreal, firms thought policy pressure was low, they may have elected
not to patent. However, once the protocol is signed, they have tangible incentives to patent any
old technologies that they may have previously been developed as fast as possible to outrun
possible competitors.
If CFC substitutes were kept secret, we should then observe an immediate peak in the num-
ber of patents in the few months following the signature of the agreement. Figure 9 plots the
number of patents mentioning CFC substitutes month by month in the two years that followed
Montreal. On the first graph, we note the absence of a patenting peak after 1987, which pro-
vides support against the hypothesis that technologies related to CFC substitutes had been kept
secret. The second graph presents trends for assignees that never patented on CFC substitutes
before 1987 and those who did. Suppose the R&D carried out before Montreal was a key driver
to the post-Montreal increase in patenting. In that case, we may observe significant differences
in patenting trends between firms with and firms without prior patenting experience on CFC
substitutes. Although a gap seems to build up over time, trends look mostly similar.
Although several dozens of firms actively patents on CFC substitutes, two firms, in particu-
lar, dominate the landscape: DuPont and Allied. In what follows, I zoom in on these two actors.
Figure 10a shows that most patents granted to DuPont and Allied were applied for after 1989,
and in particular, Figure 10b shows that there is no sudden peak patenting right after Mon-
treal. Instead, we observe a gradual ramping up of patenting activity. Figure 10c illustrates that
the patents from DuPont and Allied, which received the highest number of citations, mostly
originate from 1989 to 1991. Figure 10d indicates, however, that, in the weeks that followed
Montreal, both DuPont and Allied applied for patents that would go on receiving a high number
of citations. This seems to indicate that DuPont and Allied likely had a first-mover advantage
on some technologies. However, the magnitude of the ramping up in patenting activity that
follows from 1990 onwards supports the claim that most of the innovative activity started after
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(c) Yearly Citation Weighted Counts






















(d) Monthly Citation Weighted Counts
FIGURE 10
Patent Counts for DuPont and Allied
Note: Figure 10a shows that most patents granted to DuPont and Allied were applied for after 1989. Figure 10b
shows that there is no sudden peak patenting right after Montreal. Instead, we observe a gradual ramping up of
patenting activity. Figure 10c illustrates that the patents granted to DuPont and Allied, which received the highest
number of citations, mostly originate from 1989 to 1991. Figure 10d indicates, however, that, in the weeks that
followed Montreal, both DuPont and Allied applied for patents that would go on receiving a high number of
citations. Only patents with at least three occurrences of a molecule are retained in the sample.
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Montreal.46
7.2 Was Consumer Pressure a Potential Driver?
The science of ozone made much progress during the 1980s. In particular, in 1985, scientists
detected an extensive depletion of ozone over Antarctica (the “hole”), and importantly, they
were able to causally attribute it to CFCs in March 1988 (the “discovery”). The image of
the Earth seen from space with a massive hole (artificially colored in blue for the occasion)
became world-famous and moved public opinion. The perceived benefits of phasing out CFCs
certainly increased and made the issue more salient in the public’s eyes. To what extent, then,
did consumer pressure drive innovation in the aftermaths of Montreal?
There are very few empirical analyses suggesting that consumer pressure is effective (Lyon
and Maxwell 2002; Popp, Hafner, and Johnstone 2011), and they all deal with local pollutants
such as toxic chemical emissions. We could reasonably expect consumer pressure to be less
effective for a global air pollutant such as ozone. As profit-maximizing entities, firms would
have few incentives to incur R&D costs without the guarantee of a large market, and without
the guarantee that their foreign and domestic competitors do the same. To investigate the role of
consumer pressure for innovation on CFC substitutes, I leverage the fact that not all molecules
or applications were exposed to consumers. Restricting the analysis to substitutes unexposed
to consumers allows setting aside the possible influence of public opinion.
I use data available on the EPA SNAPs website to identify which CFC substitutes were not
exposed to consumers. The EPA website lists a total of 1001 requests corresponding to a given
substance for a given application. As part of the implementation of the Montreal Protocol, the
EPA was in charge of controlling which substitutes firms could use. To this end, any firm using
or producing substitutes had to request authorization for specific substance-application pairs.
An example is HCFC-225cb for Electronics Cleaning. I manually classify applications as either
consumer exposed, not consumer exposed, or undetermined. In doing so, I identify 6 CFC
substitutes that are not consumer exposed. The typical applications requested for these CFC
substitutes are related to industrial activities invisible to consumers: e.g., centrifugal chillers,
foam blowing agents for rigid polyurethane, or precision cleaning.
Figure 11 displays the time series of the number of patents mentioning CFC substitutes that
were arguably not exposed to consumers. We observe that, for almost all of them, the number
of patents increases sharply after 1987. This is indicative that consumer pressure and public
opinion did not play an essential role in driving innovation in the aftermath of the Montreal
protocol.
8 DISCUSSION
The role of the Montreal Protocol in solving the crisis has been intensely discussed. In a
seminal article, Barrett (1994) developed a theory of international environmental agreements
which interpreted Montreal’s success as a case of cheap cooperation. Murdoch and Sandler
46. Another way of examining the effect of the international agreement on DuPont would be to look at DuPont’s
stock market valuation. Unfortunately, although in 1986 DuPont produced CFCs for about half of the US market,
it represented only 2.2% of DuPont revenues (1.8% in 1984 and 1.7% in 1985), 2% of corporate assets and 0.9%
of DuPont’s employees (Reinhardt and Vietor 1989). It is therefore unlikely that financial markets would capture
much impact. In addition, it would difficult to attribute any movement to the regulation of CFCs only and not
to other parts of DuPont’s business (especially since DuPont was facing other public relations issues related to
medical implants of which it supplied the raw material).
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Patent Counts for CFC Substitutes not Exposed to Consumers
Note: The plot shows the number of patents mentioning CFC substitutes that were not exposed to consumers. We
observe that, for most of them, the number of patents increases sharply after 1987. This indicates that consumer
pressure and public opinion did not play an essential role in driving innovation in the aftermath of the Montreal
protocol.
(1997) also argued that some countries, and in particular the USA, accepted to sign Montreal
because the costs of doing so were low. Murdoch and Sandler (1997) highlighted the existence
of a cost-and-benefit analysis issued by the EPA in 1987, concluding that the estimated benefits
(mostly from cancers avoided) overwhelmed the estimated costs to the industry. Montreal being
“cheap” has often been rephrased as the idea that substitutes existed. However, it is more exact
to interpret it as an agreement that industries and governments expected to be technologically
feasible within the time frame agreed upon.
This paper highlights that, even if Montreal encoded what some thought feasible from a
technological point of view, much experimentation and R&D investments were still required.
As a result, the agreement induced innovation. By considering the effects of international
agreements on innovation, we are given the opportunity to re-interpret Montreal’s success.
Montreal’s negotiated targets can be seen as modest. In fact, in 1987, diplomats failed to
negotiate a full ban against which the industry actively lobbied. Real success should be seen
in the later amendments (London in 1990 and Copenhagen in 1992), where more ambitious
reduction targets were agreed (deepening) and other molecules added to the list of regulated
compounds (widening). Montreal may not have been very ambitious, but, it set up a credible
enforcement mechanism that changed firms’ expectations about CFCs and, hence, induced
innovation. In doing so, it contributed to lowering down the perceived costs associated with a
complete phase-out.
Conceptualizing agreements as a vehicle for inducing innovation bears important implica-
tions for how we interpret the theory of international agreements. To make my argument, I use
a stylized model of international environmental agreement and model induced innovation as a
small learning rate. In the basic setup, N countries pollute and can decide to pay for pollution
abatement. The costs are incurred by each country separately while the benefits of abatement
accrue to all. Free-riding incentives, therefore, arise: countries would be better off if all were to
abate a high amount of emissions (the cooperative level), but the Nash equilibrium of the game
leaves all countries at a lower amount of abatement (the non-cooperative level).
As explained in Barrett (1994), the marginal costs of abatement and the marginal benefits
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from abatement determine the magnitude of the gains from cooperation, that is, how much
better off countries would be if all were abating at the cooperative level rather than staying at
the non-cooperative one. As illustrated on Figure 12a, cooperation gains are high when both
marginal costs and marginal benefits are large. This area corresponds to where cooperation pro-
vides the most additional welfare compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. Barrett (1994)
showed that this area is, unfortunately, the least likely to support successful self-enforcing
agreements. The Montreal Protocol can be interpreted as an agreement located in this area
where cooperation gains are low, as depicted on Figure 12a. On the other hand, the targets
negotiated in 1990 and 1992 (London and Copenhagen) would be located, from the perspective
of 1987, in the area of higher cooperation gains because, in 1987, the London and Copenhagen
targets were seen too costly to be part of the agreement.
I build on this simple model by assuming that countries make their abatement decisions over
several time periods and by endogenizing innovation. Now, the marginal costs of abatement in
period t depends on the amount of abatement done in period t −1:
ct(qt) = ct−1(1− r)qt−1 (5)
ct stands for the marginal cost of abatement in period t, qt for the amount of abatement done in
period t and r is a constant between 0 and 1 that can be interpreted as a learning rate. Abatement
in period t − 1, therefore, leads to reductions in the abatement costs in period t. This models
the effect of induced innovation: by enforcing qt emission reduction in period t, the agreement
forces firm to do new things, to experiment with, develop new or improve old technologies.
These processes pave the way for lowering the marginal cost of abatement in the next period.
Over several time periods, the area of high cooperation gains becomes smaller, indicating
that allocations that used to be difficult to achieve are now within reach.47 In turn, the level
of abatement in the non-cooperative equilibrium increases. Concretely, more abatement is
undertaken by all countries even in the absence of cooperation. As a result, for any point on
Figure 12b, the gains from cooperation are lower compared to Figure 12a. In 1987, the London
and Copenhagen targets were too expensive, but induced innovation made then within reach of
an agreement a few years later.
The success story of Montreal is better summarized as a repeated cooperation game where
induced innovation enabled emission reduction ambitions to ratchet up. It is a case of the the-
ories of international environmental agreements and induced innovation walking hand in hand.
At each stage, binding reductions force firms to innovate and develop technologies to comply.
With realized innovations, expectations for further innovation increase, and the expected costs
of abatement decrease. More aggressive reductions then appear affordable, and governments
and industries become willing to increase ambition and bind themselves to it.
9 CONCLUSION
Understanding the drivers of technological change is a critical input to improving the prospects
of cooperation because tackling environmental problems often relies on developing and diffus-
ing new technologies. In this paper, I document that the Montreal Protocol led to the devel-
opment of CFCs substitutes. This empirical evidence goes against the often-heard narrative
that alternatives technologies were readily available before the treaty, narrative which was once

















































(b) After Induced Innovation (e.g., 1992)
FIGURE 12
Gains from Cooperation and Induced Innovation
Note: The figure interprets the success of the Montreal protocol in light of the theory of international environ-
mental agreements. The x-axis represents the scale of the costs of abating one more unit of CFC emissions. The
y-axis represents the scale of the benefits arising from the avoided ozone depletion due to one more unit of abated
emissions. Following Barrett (1994), areas where cooperation gains are high are the least likely to support self-
enforcing agreements. Figure 12a represents the locations of targets agreed in Montreal, London and Copenhagen
from the vantage point of 1987. In the 1987, the London and Copenhagen targets were out of reach. Figure 12b
illustrates that induced innovation increases the set of negotiable outcomes.
dubbed “the most pervasive and most widespread myth surrounding the Montreal Protocol”.48
In fact, the treatment effect estimated in this paper tells a story where almost all of the science
and innovation on CFC substitutes was triggered by the post-Montreal regime. By showing
that a low-ambition but binding agreement such as the Montreal Protocol did encourage the de-
velopment of technological solutions, this paper suggests such agreements are potent tools that
dynamically improve the benefit-cost equation of environmental protection and may therefore
also be useful to deal with current problems such as climate change.
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